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Abstract  
This study examines the impact of board composition on the economic performance of firms in Nigeria. 
This study is significant because it attempts to analyze the relationship between corporate governance 
practices and financial performance in Nigeria thus providing a basis for a framework for institutional 
regulations. Board composition in this study is in terms of the proportion of the board of directors in 
Nigeria that is represented by outside non-executive directors. The hypothesis for the study is that there is 
no significant positive relationship between board composition and firm performance in Nigeria.  The study 
uses a cross-sectional design, using a survey of a sample of 38 firms during the 2009 financial year. Results 
show that outside non-executive directors do not create any economic value added though may have some 
benefits. The results of the study are consistent with those of earlier studies for both developed and 
developing economies that there is no explicitly clear relationship between board composition and firm 
performance. 
Key words: Board composition, Corporate performance, Corporate governance, Non-executive directors. 
1. Introduction 
Corporate failures and massive corporate scandals in recent years have led to considerable interests in 
literature and research into corporate governance principles and codes of best practices with a view to 
improving corporate governance and enhancing corporate performance/survival. A key component in 
corporate governance implementation is the role of the board of directors. The board monitors the 
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management and set the strategic direction for the organization. The board reviews and ratifies 
management proposals, and it is the primary and dominant internal corporate governance mechanism in the 
organization (Brennan, 2006 and Jonsson, 2005).  
Corporate failures and scandals such as those of Enron, WorldCom and HIH, amongst others, have raised 
the question as to the ability of the board to effectively monitor management (Rashid, 2011 and Migruchi, 
2004). This question is particularly relevant given that the boards were apparently not effective enough to 
have been able to present a check on some of the corporate governance failures, as they later came to be 
identified. This then calls to question the structure and composition of such boards. According to Rashid 
(2011) this raises an important question, that is, “who will monitor the monitors? Although it is agreed that 
the shareholders will monitor the board by exercising their ownership right by appointing and removing   
board members, shareholders may not be aware of the inside activities of the firm.’’ 
It is therefore often argued that the board should be structured and composed of in such a way that it will 
act to monitor its own activities. Rashid (2011) further notes that “corporate governance literature debated 
within two extreme streams of board practices examining whether the board composition in the form of 
representation of outside independent directors and structural dependence of the board influence the firm 
performance.  
The question therefore is “does the composition of the board of directors influence the firm performance or 
does firm performance influence the composition of the board of directors?” (Davidson & Rowe, 2004). 
Existing literature on the relationship between the board composition and firm performance reflects mixed 
results. The idea of endogenous relationship between board composition and corporate performance was 
advanced by Hermalin & Weisbach (2000), that is, board composition and corporate performance jointly 
influence each other rather the board composition influencing corporate performance or corporate 
performance influencing board composition Davidson & Rowe (2004) note that board composition and 
financial performance influence each other but the effect is delayed. That is the idea in their intertemporal 
endogeneity in board composition and financial performance..  
Universally accepted corporate performance measures are difficult to come by. Davidson & Rowe (2004) 
note that, “There are several measurement issues (such as differences in accounting and reporting across 
industries) that may make finding a relation between board composition and financial performance difficult 
at best.” While Sahin, Basfirinci & Ozsalin (2011) measure corporate performance in terms of financial 
performance and social responsibility performance, commonly used measures of firm performance are 
Return on Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q (a market based performance measure) (Rashid, De Zoysa, Lodh & 
Rudkin, 2010). Others measures of performance that  have been used include average gross turnover, 
average growth rate of turnover, and ordinary shares held by the corporate sector - corporate holding 
(Siriwardhane, 2003). Eklund, Palmberg & Wiberg (2009) used market value (defined as the total value of 
outstanding shares plus total debt) as a measure of performance, in this study the measures adopted are: 
return on equity (ROE), return on capital employed (ROCE), return on asset managed (ROAM), earnings 
per share (EPS) and dividends per share (DPS).   
This study aims to investigate the relationship between board composition and company performance, 
using Nigerian corporate entities. This is to determine if the Nigerian situation is in line with global trend or 
if we can find a definite pattern of relationship between board composition and corporate performance for 
the Nigeria corporate world. 
To achieve this purpose, the remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews previous 
literature and findings of previous researches. Section 3 presents the methodology and the sample data of 
the study. Section 4 presents the findings of the study and discusses the empirical results. The final section 
provides the discussion of the findings and conclusions of the study. 
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2. Review of Literature  
2.1 Corporate Governance Principles - The Board of Directors 
The Report of the Committee on Corporate Governance of Public Companies in Nigeria (2003) puts the 
board of directors at the centre of the implementation of corporate governance principles of public 
companies in Nigeria. The Report notes that the board of directors should be responsible for the affairs of 
the company in a lawful and efficient manner in such a way as to ensure that the company is constantly 
improving its value creation. The board should ensure that the value being created is shared among the 
shareholders and employees with due regard to the interests of other stakeholders. To perform these 
responsibilities the board should amongst others, ensure the integrity of financial controls and reports and 
ensure that ethical standards are maintained and that the company complies with the laws of Nigeria.    
To be able to play the required role effectively and efficiently the Report recommends what the 
composition of the board of directors should look like. The Report recommends that the board should be 
composed in such a way as to ensure diversity of experience without compromising integrity, 
compatibility, availability and independence. The board should comprise of a mix of executive and non-
executive directors, the board should not exceed fifteen (15) and not less than five (5) persons in total. The 
Report also recommends that the board should not be dominated by one individual, and that the position of 
chairman, and chief executive officer should be separated and held by different persons since a 
combination of the two positions in one individual would represent undue concentration of power. While 
the chief executive officer and his management team are in charge of the day-to-day operations of the 
company, the chairman’s primary responsibility is to ensure effective operations of the board and should as 
far as possible maintain a distance from the day-to-day operations of the company. 
The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) (2006) attributed weaknesses in corporate governance of banks in 
Nigeria to include the following, amongst others: 
 Ineffective board oversight functions; 
 Disagreements between board and management giving rise to board squabbles; 
 Fraudulent and self-serving practices among members of the board, management and staff; 
 Overbearing influence of chairman or MD/CEO, especially in family-controlled banks.  
All these weaknesses have to do with the structure and composition of the board of directors. The strategic 
importance of the board of directors in the promotion of corporate governance practices led the CBN to 
maintain that the board of directors for a bank in Nigeria should essentially be one that is committed and 
focused in the discharge of its responsibilities with a high degree of independence from the management 
and individual shareholders and so composed that there is a balance of power and authority so that no 
individual or coalition of individuals has unfettered powers of decision making. Still on the composition of 
the board, the CBN recommends that “The number of non-executive directors should exceed that of 
executive directors.’’ On the issue of executive duality, the CBN clearly outlaws the combination of the 
role of the head of the board (the chairman) and that of the chief executive officer on one person as this will 
create individuals with unfettered powers of decision making. It even goes further to recommend that “no 
two members of the same extended family should occupy the position of the chairman and that of chief 
executive officer or executive director of a bank at the same time.’’ 
2.2 Theories of Corporate Governance 
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As noted by Rashid (2011) a ‘’number of theoretical perspectives are used in explaining corporate 
governance practices and problems’’ Among these perspectives are agency theory, stewardship theory and 
resource dependence theory. The agency theory is built on the separation of ownership and control. It holds 
the view that an individual is self-interested and self-opportunist and not altruistic. The managers (the 
agents) who have control of the organization may not always act in the best interest of the owners (the 
principals) and may be driven by self-interest to pursue their self-activities to the detriment of the welfare 
of those they represent. The thrust of this theory is that the interest of the principals (the shareholders) is 
best protected when the board composition is such as is dominated by outside independent directors who 
will be able to monitor any self interest activities of managers and so enhance board performance (Rashid, 
2011; Kaymak & Bektas, 2008 and Luan & Tang, 2007). The theory suggests that CEO duality diminishes 
the monitoring role of the board of directors over the executive manager, and this may in turn have a 
negative effect on corporate performance, also that CEO duality reduces firm performance because of CEO 
entrenchment and a decline in board independence (Elsayed, 2007 and Kang & Zardkoohi, 2005). The tenet 
of this theory is based on the premise that there is an inherent conflict between the interest of the firm’s 
owners and its management (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003). 
In contrast, the stewardship theory adopts a more optimistic view of humans. The theory believes that the 
agent may not be self-opportunist, motivated by individual goals but may actually be motivated to work in 
the interest of the principal. The implication of this theory is that insiders are better than outsider directors 
since outside independent directors ‘’are not as agents be the best stewards to their corporations and are not 
motivated by individual goals,’’ The theory also argues for CEO duality (Ong & Lee, 2000; Luan & Tang, 
2007 and Rashid, 2011). 
The resource dependence theory maintains that the board is an essential link between the firm and the 
external resources that a firm needs to maximize its performance. A mayor criticism of this theory is that 
empirical findings can be interpreted according to the paradigm of the researcher (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003 
and Pettigrew, 1992). According to this theory the board is an important strategic resource for the firm in 
terms of knowledge, contact with the business world, source of capital, new markets/competitors, so that 
increased diversification on the board is positive for firm performance (Eklund, Palmberg & Wiberg, 2009) 
2.3 Board Composition and Corporate Performance 
Board composition is measured in terms of different degrees of heterogeneity. Common assessments of 
board composition are usually, insider/outsider director ratio, executive/nor-executive directors ratio, age 
and gender diversity among board members and board size. There are inconclusive findings between the 
relationship between board composition and firm performance (Finegold, Benson & Hecht, 2007; Frick & 
Bermig, 2009; Rashid, De Zoysa, Lodh & Rudkin, 2010 and Tang, Panasian, Prevost & Bhabra, 2004). 
Board heterogeneity has a lot of advantages due to enhanced decision making from more information, but 
this would come at a considerable cost. It is in light of this that Eklud, Palmberg &  Wiberg (2009) note 
that:  
Board heterogeneity is associated with a trade-off between increased costs in terms of longer 
decision time and lower external costs. That is, a trade-off between increased information 
efficiency associated with heterogeneous boards and decision efficiency associated with 
homogenous boards. Heterogeneous boards tend to be better informed regarding issues  outside 
the firm and thereby better equipped to question and discuss corporate strategic decisions, 
whereas homogenous boards to a larger extent is based on trust, cooperation, as well as shared 
experience and values.  
On composition in terms of the insider-outsider director ratio, the agency theory tends to favour more 
outsider directors. Insider directors are directors who are also executives and serve in at least one of the 
following categories: Management of the company or advisers of the company, and insider directors are 
those who are not executives (Davidson & Rowe, 2004). Sahin, Basfirinci & Ozsalih (2011) observe that 
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previous literature does not offer consistent findings on the impact of insider-outsider director proportion 
on financial performance. Many of the studies suggest a positive relationship between outsider-dominated 
boards and the performance of the company. Some other studies however found no significant relationship 
between the proportion of insider/outsider directors and company performance (compare Pearce & Zahra 
(1992), Daily & Dalton (1993) and Krivogorsky, (2006) on one hand with Bhagat & Black(1999), Daily & 
Johnson (1997) and Dulewicz & Herbert (2004) on the other hand). 
Finegold, Benson & Hecht (2007) note that: 
 The many empirical studies that have examined the impact to the insider-outsider ratio 
on boards have found no consistent evidence to suggest that increasing the percentage of 
outsiders on the board will enhance performance. If anything, they suggest that pushing 
too far to remove insider and affiliated directors may harm firm performance by 
depriving boards of the valuable firm and industry specific knowledge they provide. 
The argument challenging the beauty of outsider independent directors has been that of information 
asymmetry between insider directors and outsider directors. It is argued that insider directors live in the 
company they govern and so have better understanding of the business than outsider directors hence are 
better able make useful decisions, while the outsider directors lack day to day inside knowledge of 
company and so may have a reduced control role of the firm (Kiel, 2007 and Rashid, De Zoysa, Lodh & 
Rudkin, 2010).  
The arguments for increasing the proportion of outsider independent directors have been based on the 
agency theory that such outsider independent directors are better able to protect the interest of the 
shareholders. It is argued that the insider directors will not be able to effectively monitors the day-to-day 
activities of the managers since that will effectively mean that they are monitoring their own operation 
which is operationally impracticable. 
It seems therefore that this debate will remain open-ended moreso as there are no empirical findings to tilt 
the argument in any particular direction. There are many explanations for the inconclusive results on this 
relationship: one of such explanations is that boards that are optimally weighted between insiders and 
outsiders would result in an insignificant relation being expected. Another explanation is that simultaneity 
between key variables of interest confounds the interpretation of results in studies that focus on a direct 
relation. Another explanation is that performance and board characteristics, such as composition are jointly 
endogenous: firm performance is a function not only of past board independence but, also a predictor of the 
future board structure (Panasian, Prevost & Bhabra, 2004). 
Corporate governance literature tends to advocate expanding the independent/outsider elements in 
corporate boards. It is therefore portrayed in literature that board composition is in some way related to 
corporate performance. The Nigerian Codes of Best Practices also seek to strengthen the 
independent/outsider elements on the board (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2006 and Report of Corporate 
Governance of Public Companies in Nigeria, 2003). Panasian, Prevost & Bhabra (2004) remark that: 
“Despite the inconclusive results of empirical literature on the effectiveness of outsider directors on the 
board, an international movement advocating greater board independence continues to strengthen.” 
CEO duality exists when the same person doubles as the chairman of the board and chief executive officer 
of the company at the same time. This is usually considered as improper as the board is expected to monitor 
the operations of the chief executive officer and his management team. It is always argued that this role 
cannot be effectively performed by the board if the CEO is also the chairman of the board. Empirical 
studies on the relationship between CEO duality and performance have yield conflicting conclusions 
(Sahin, Basfirinci & Ozsalih, 2011). Some studies favour CEO duality, suggesting that it may improve 
corporate performance. Others believe that CEO duality has a negative effect on firm performance 
(compare Kula (2005; Tian & Lau (2001) with Kaymak & Bektas (2008)). 
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In terms of board size, most studies examining the relation between board size and the effect on financial 
performance have affirmed that “board size and financial performance are negatively correlated. The reason 
advanced for this is that as the size of a group increases, the problems of communication and coordination 
increase (Yermack, 1996 and Sahin, Basfirinci & Ozsalin, 2001). The argument is that large boards would 
tend to be more diverse, more contentious, and more fragmented than small boards. Keeping boards small 
therefore can help improve their performance since as has been suggested by research findings, as a group 
increases in size, they become less effective because co-ordination and process problem would outweigh 
the advantages gained by having people of diverse background (Siriwardhane, 2003). 
 
3. Data and Methodology  
This study uses the cross-sectional design in organizing the study subjects for the study. Particularly, the 
survey procedure was used in this study. The results of operations of the companies for the 2009 financial 
year were used in this study. This study used a sample of Nigerian firms (sample size of 38), randomly 
drawn from a list of companies quoted on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). This simple random 
sampling procedure was used in the exercise. 
The data used in this study were obtained from the published annual reports and accounts of these 
companies (secondary sources). The study uses simple regression to evaluate the relationships between the 
variables. This is calculated as: 
r  =              ∑ХY 
             ∑ Х2           ∑Y2 
The predictive strength of this is examined by the coefficient of determination.  
3.1 Variables Definitions 
3.1.1 Independent Variable  
Board composition is used in this study as the independent variable. Board composition is here defined as 
the percentage of membership of the board constituted of by non-executive directors (Rashid, De Zoysa, 
Lodh & Rudkin, 2010). This satisfies the definition of board composition provided by the Report of the 
Committee on Corporate Governance of Public Companies in Nigeria (2003).  
3.1.2 Dependent Variables 
Corporate performance is used in this study as the dependent variable. The different performance measures 
used in this study are: Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Capital Employed (ROCE), Return on Asset 
managed (ROAM), Earnings per Share (EPS) and Dividend per Shares (DPS). The different measures are 
used to provide a comprehensive examination of different angles of performance. They are also used 
because they represent very simplistic measures of performance.  
3.2 Research Hypothesis 
The research hypothesis tested in this study is: “there is no significant positive relationship between board 
composition and corporate performance” 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
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The descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the model are shown in Table I. From Table I, the 
average proportion of non-executive directors in the sample is 64.6% ranging from 42% to 91% with a 
standard deviation of 12.2%. With respect to all the performance measures used to the mean ROE is 9.01% 
and ranges from negative 57.92% to 49.9%, a mean of 39.8% ranging from negative 32.4% to 499% under 
the ROCE measure. The average ROAM is 6.97%, ranging from negative 25.14% to 29.32%. The average 
EPS is N0.92, with a range of N19.8 from negative N8.48 to N11.32 and a standard deviation of N2.97. 
Average DPS is N0.76 ranging from 0 to N12.80. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the sample  
Variable Number Mean Minimum Maximum Std dev 
Non-
Executive 
directors 
38 0.646 0.42 0.91 0.122 
ROE 38 9.01% (57.92%) 49.9% 29.61% 
ROCE 38 39.8% 32.38% 499.% 103.5% 
ROAM 38 6.97% 25.14% 29.32% 10.39% 
EPS 38 N0.92 (N8.48) N11.32 N2.97 
DPS 38 N0.76 0 N12.80 N2.07 
Source: Computed from various annual reports. 
The results of the analysis carried out to examine the relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables are presented in the correlation matrix in Table 2. The model uses the simple regression analysis 
in evaluating the relationship between board composition and the different performance measures (ROE, 
ROCE, ROAM, EPS, and DPS). The different performance measures are separately regressed on board 
composition in terms of the proportion of the board constituted of by non-executive directors. 
Table 2: Correlation matrix of explanatory variables  
Performance 
measure 
Regression 
coefficient 
Coefficient of 
determination 
ROE 0.345 11.9% 
ROCE 0.3386 11.46% 
ROAM 0.5290 27.98% 
EPS 02934 8.61% 
DPS 0.3209 10.3% 
Source: Researchers’ computations 
The model shows that none of the dependent variables is significantly correlated with the independent 
variable (board composition). In fact, only ROAM is correlated with board composition, though at a very 
weak level. This is further confirmed by the coefficients of determination which show that none of the 
variations explained by the relationships between board composition and all the performance measures is 
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meaningful. The coefficients of determination for the different relationships are all less than 30% with the 
highest being 27.98% and one as low as 8.61%, and the average being 14.05%. 
The results indicate that there is no significant relationship between board composition and corporate 
performance in Nigeria, using any of the performance measures. The implication of this is that a firm 
cannot enhance its economic performance by increasing the non-executive directors on its board. These 
results are consistent with similar studies conducted for both developed and developing economies that no 
explicitly clear relationship exists between board composition and firm performance (Judge, Naoumova & 
Koutzevol, 2003 and Rashid, De Zoysa, Lodh & Rudkin, 2010). 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
This study seeks to examine the influence of board composition in the form of the representation of 
outsider non-executive directors on the economic performance of firms in Nigeria. The empirical results of 
the study suggest that there is no significant relationship between board composition and any of the 
performance measures used (that is, ROE, ROCE, ROAM, EPS and DPS). This means that non-executive 
directors do not add any economic value to the firms in Nigeria. 
In our opinion, outsider non-executive directors play a significant role in providing independent advice 
during corporate decision making process, while such advice may enhance overall corporate governance, 
such advice may not be significant enough as to create any economic value added to the overall corporate 
performance. This may, in part, be due to the fact that as outsiders, the non-executive directors may be 
constrained in term of information. They rely on the insiders for the information required for informed 
decision making. And there may be information asymmetry. It seems difficult to see how non-executive 
directors can provide effective differential judgmental contributions to firms. From the analysis therefore 
we would like to conclude that the introduction of regulations stipulating the proportion of outsider, non-
executive directors on the boards of companies, while is appealing from agency theory point of view, such 
regulations may not create any economic value added. Even if outsider non-executive directors enhance 
firm performance, such enhancement must be indirect and not in measurable terms. We therefore suggest 
that further studies be carried out on how outsider non-executive directors might indirectly contribute to 
corporate performance so as to provide an institutional framework for formulating policies in such regards. 
References 
Bhagat, S. & Black, B. (1999). The Uncertain Relationship between Board Composition and Firm 
Performance. Business lawyer, 54 (3), 921 -963. 
Brennan, N. (2006). Boards of Directors and Firm Performance: Is there an Expectations Gap? Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 14(6), 577-593. 
Central Bank of Nigeria (2006), Code of Corporate Governance for Banks in Nigeria Post Consolidation. 
Daily, C. M & Dalton, D. R. (1993). Board of Directors Leadership and Structure and Corporate 
Performance in Entrepreneurial Firms. Journal of Business Ventures, 7(5), 375 -386.  
Daily, C.M. & Johnson, J. L (1997). Sources of CEO Power and Firm Financial Performance: A 
longitudinal Assessment. Journal of Management, 23(2), 97 -112. 
Davidson III, W. N & Rowe, W. (2004). Intertemporal Endogeneity in Board Composition and Financial 
Performance. Corporate Ownership and Control 1 (4), 49 – 60. 
Dulewicz, V. and Herbert, P. (2004). Does the Composition and Practice of Boards and Directors Bear any 
Relationship to the Performance of the Companies? Corporate Governance, 12 (3), 263 - 280 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol 2, No 4, 2011 
 
72 
 
Eklund, J. E, Palmberg, J. & Wiberg, D. (2009). Ownership Structure, Board Composition and Investment 
Performance. CESIS Electronic Working Paper Series, Paper no. 172. 
Elsayed, K. (2007). Does CEO Duality Really Affect Corporate Performance? Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 15(6), 1203 - 1224. 
Finegold, D., Benson, G. S & Hecht, D. (2007). Corporate Boards and Company Performance: Review of 
Research in light of Recent Reforms. Blackwell, 15(5), 865 - 878. 
Frick, B. & Bermig, A. (2009). Board Size, Board Composition and Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence 
from Germany. Working Paper, JEL -Code G38, 125,  J53. 
Jonsson, F.I (2005). The Role Model of the Board: A Preliminary Study of the Roles of Iceland Board. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13(5), 710-717 
Judge, W. Q, Naoumova, L. & Koutzevol, N. (2003). Corporate Governance and Firm Performance in 
Russia: An Empirical Study. Journal of World Business 38 (4). 
Kang, E. & Zardkoohi, A. (2005). Board Leadership Structure and Firm Performance. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 13(6), 785 – 799. 
Kaymark, T. & Bektas, E. (2008). East Meets West? Board Characteristics in an Emerging Market: 
Evidence from Turkish Banks. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 16(6), 550 - 561. 
Kiel, G.C. & Nicholson, G. J. (2003). Board Composition and Corporate Performance: How the Australian 
Experience informs contrasting Theories of Corporate Governance. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 11(3), 189 - 205. 
Krivogosky, V. (2006). Ownership, Board Structure and Performance in Continental Europe. International 
Journal of Accounting 41(2), 176 - 197. 
Kula, V. (2005). The Impact of the Roles, Structure and Process of Boards or Firm Performance: Evidence 
from Turkey. Corporate Governance, 13(2), 265 - 276. 
Mizruchia, M. S (2004). Berle and Means Revisited: The Governance and Power of U.S Corporation. 
Theory and Society 33, 579 - 617. 
Nicholson, G. & Kiel, G. (2007). Can Directors Impact Performance? A Case-based test of three Theories 
of Corporate Governance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(4), 585 – 608. 
Luna, C & Tang, M. (2007). Where is Independent Director Efficacy? Corporate Governance: An 
international Review, 15(4), 636 - 643. 
Ong, C. H. & Lee, S. H. (2000). Board Functions and firm performance: A Review and Direction for 
Future Research. Journal of Comparative International Management, 3(1), 3 - 21. 
Panasian, C., Prevost, A.K & Bhabra, H.S (2004). Board Composition and Firm Performance: The Case of 
the Dey Report and Publicly Listed Canadian Firms. 
Pearce, J. A. & Zahra, S.A (1992). Board Composition from a Strategic Management Perspective. Journal 
of Management Studies, 29 (4), 411 – 438. 
Pettigrew, A. M. (1992). On Studying Managerial Elites. Strategic Management Journal 13, 163 - 182. 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol 2, No 4, 2011 
 
73 
 
Rashid, A. (2011). Board Composition Board Leadership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from 
Bangladesh. A Paper for Inclusion in the Accounting and Finance Association Australia and New Zealand 
Annual Conference Adelaide, July 5-7
th
. 
Report of the Committee on Corporate Governance of Public Companies in Nigeria (2003) 
Siriwardhane, P. (2003). Broadening the Boardroom: Corporate Governance and Company performance in 
Sri Lanka. [Online] Available: pavithra.siriwardhane@rmit.edu.au. (May 29, 2011). 
Tian, J. J & Lau, C. M. (2004). Board Composition, Leadership Structure and Performance in Chinese 
Listed Companies. Asia Pacific Journal of Management 18, 245 - 268. 
Yermack, D. (1996). Higher Market Valuation of Companies with small Board of Directors. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 40 (2), 185 - 211. 
 
This academic article was published by The International Institute for Science, 
Technology and Education (IISTE).  The IISTE is a pioneer in the Open Access 
Publishing service based in the U.S. and Europe.  The aim of the institute is 
Accelerating Global Knowledge Sharing. 
 
More information about the publisher can be found in the IISTE’s homepage:  
http://www.iiste.org 
 
The IISTE is currently hosting more than 30 peer-reviewed academic journals and 
collaborating with academic institutions around the world.   Prospective authors of 
IISTE journals can find the submission instruction on the following page: 
http://www.iiste.org/Journals/ 
The IISTE editorial team promises to the review and publish all the qualified 
submissions in a fast manner. All the journals articles are available online to the 
readers all over the world without financial, legal, or technical barriers other than 
those inseparable from gaining access to the internet itself. Printed version of the 
journals is also available upon request of readers and authors.  
IISTE Knowledge Sharing Partners 
EBSCO, Index Copernicus, Ulrich's Periodicals Directory, JournalTOCS, PKP Open 
Archives Harvester, Bielefeld Academic Search Engine, Elektronische 
Zeitschriftenbibliothek EZB, Open J-Gate, OCLC WorldCat, Universe Digtial 
Library , NewJour, Google Scholar 
 
 
